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Abstract
Innovation research has developed a broad set of methodological approaches in
recent decades. In this paper, we propose laboratory experiments as a fruitful
methodological addition to the existing methods in innovation research. Therefore,
we provide an overview of the existing methods, discuss the advantages and
limitations of laboratory experiments, and review experimental studies dealing with
different fields of innovation policy, namely intellectual property rights, financial
instruments, payment schemes, and R&D competition. These studies show that
laboratory experiments can fruitfully complement the established methods in
innovation research and provide novel empirical evidence by creating and analyzing
counterfactual situations.
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Introduction
Fostering research and innovativeness to support economic growth and increase com-
petitiveness has become a central paradigm for policy makers worldwide in recent de-
cades. The European Commission has recently reaffirmed this goal by committing to
spend up to 3 % of the European Union’s GDP to support private innovation activity
until 2020. By means of this and other policy instruments, the EU thus aims to become
an “innovation union” (COM(2014) 339). This paradigmatic focus has been adopted by
the scientific community, which similarly discusses the topics of innovation and indus-
trial policy broadly, trying to obtain insights and provide advice to policy makers con-
cerning the design of policy instruments that optimally foster innovation activity
(Mazzucato et al. 2015).
Economic innovation research traditionally argues for government intervention in
the case of market failure, which is characterized by the imperfect allocation of re-
sources, for example, due to imperfect competition, information failures, negative ex-
ternalities, public goods, and coordination failures (Bator, 1958). Given the political
commitment to foster innovation activity, government interventions can provide rem-
edies to market failures. For this purpose, several distinct methods of supporting pri-
vate economic subjects in their innovation activities have been developed. Firstly,
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regulatory instruments such as rules, norms, and standards have been introduced, such
as patents and copyright law. These regulations are compulsory for all economic actors
and thus shape the overall market conditions for innovative products and processes.
Secondly, financial instruments have been introduced to promote innovative activity,
with examples including subsidies, cash grants, and reduced interest-loans, as well as
disincentives like tariffs, taxes, and charges. Thirdly, there are “soft” instruments that
include normative incentives such as moral appeals to economic actors and voluntary
commitments like technical standards or public-private partnerships (Borrás and
Edquist 2013; Vedung 1998).
To analyze and evaluate the effects and optimal design of these instruments, eco-
nomic innovation research has established a large number of empirical research
methods. Along with the overall expansion and professionalization of experimental eco-
nomics, behavioral evidence collected in laboratory experiments have become a vital
complement to economic innovation research in recent years. Following Sørensen et al.
(2010) and Chetty (2015), we suggest that lab experiments constitute a promising
addition to the methodological toolkit in innovation research, thus advancing novel in-
sights and providing predictions and policy implications by incorporating behavioral
factors. We thus argue that laboratory experiments should be used if they yield add-
itional evidence unattainable by other methods in a particular field of study. This reso-
nates with the arguments by Falk and Heckman (2009); Chetty (2015); Madrian (2014);
and Weimann (2015), who propose a pragmatic approach concerning the use of evi-
dence derived from experimental methods, arguing that all empirical methods should
be viewed as complementary (Falk and Heckman 2009). In this paper, we aim to con-
tribute to the growing field of experimental innovation research, firstly by outlining the
advantages and limitations of different methodological approaches in innovation re-
search and more specifically laboratory experiments. Secondly, since former papers
have not attempted to summarize and structure the existing experimental literature, we
provide a literature review of the existing experimental approaches to the field of
innovation policy with the most important studies from four sub-fields in which lab ex-
periments have been conducted to date. We conclude by emphasizing the further use
of laboratory experiments to innovation research.
This paper is structured as follows: in chapter two, we outline the range of methods
in economic innovation research, before discussing the scopes of the experimental
method in detail in chapter three. Subsequently, we present a selection of laboratory
experiments in the field of innovation policy, namely intellectual property rights, finan-
cial instruments, payment schemes, and R&D competition. A conclusion is finally pro-
vided in chapter four.
Methodological approaches in innovation research
A large number of research methods have been developed to analyze which policy in-
struments might best foster innovative activity. Weimann (2015, pp. 247–248) catego-
rizes the different methods of generating insight by their features regarding their ability
to identify causal relations, their generalizability to other contexts (external validity) as
well as their broad applicability; particularly, the trade-off between causality and exter-
nal validity is emphasized. Thus, Weimann distinguishes between (1) neoclassical
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models pointing out causal relationships, (2) “traditional” empirical research primarily
showing correlations, (3) natural experiments attempting to substantiate causal rela-
tionships, (4) randomized field experiments that optimally offset the trade-off between
causality and external validity, and (5) laboratory experiments providing a strong caus-
ality, yet lacking external validity. Figure 1 provides an overview of these methodo-
logical approaches and their features in a Venn diagram. The figure shows that none of
the existing methods is able to fulfill all three features identified by Weimann (2015)
but can only meet one or two criteria.
(1) Neoclassical models such as game theoretical or general equilibrium models have
the advantages of enabling deriving causal relations and being easily applicable, yet they
often lack external validity. Empirical investigations in innovation economics most
commonly use the methods of (2) “traditional” empirical economic research, for in-
stance, official patent statistics or micro firm-level data from surveys. For this, OLS es-
timations are considered appropriate to analyze and quantify observable variables of
innovation processes; however, for dynamic effects, these methods often lead to prob-
lems of causality, endogeneity, and selectivity. A further shortcoming of using this form
of data is that innovation surveys necessarily rely on the entrepreneurs’ willingness to
voluntarily disclose information about their firm, which potentially biases the data. Fur-
thermore, the extent to which government funding is actually used for research by the
firms often remains unclear and the public funding decisions often lead to a selectivity
bias, thus making public funding an endogenous variable, which establishes further de-
pendencies between the respective variables (Busom, 2000). Moreover, patents and pa-
tent pools are often used as an approximation for the innovation activity to estimate
the firms’ innovation output. This prompts a number of issues, for example, because
small and medium enterprises use other forms of protecting their innovations and pa-
tent less than large firms, due to potentially expensive patent litigations and patent
theft (Thomä and Bizer 2013). Nevertheless, this methodological approach to
innovation research has strongly improved its data availability, methods, and research
designs in the past 25 years, implementing methods such as difference-in-difference es-
timators, sample selection models, instrumental variables, and non-parametric match-
ing methods (Angrist and Pischke 2010; Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014). Overall, this
Fig. 1 Methodological approaches and their features. Note: the figure is based on the classification by
Weimann (2015)
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approach entails a high level of external validity and applicability but often only a low
level of causality.
Another empirical means of evaluating policy instruments is (3) natural experiments,
which feature a high level of external validity. Furthermore, due to improved methodo-
logical approaches, causal relations have substantiated in recent years. However, the ap-
plicability is often low, since it is difficult to find appropriate control groups that could
enable a clear comparison (Weimann 2015).
It has been argued that the issues involved with using the “traditional” methods
of empirical economic can best be solved by conducting (4) randomized field ex-
periments in which real-life incidents are treated similar to experiments. They are
considered the “gold standard” for evaluating new policy instruments as they en-
able identifying causality rather than mere correlations (Boockmann et al. 2014;
Falck et al. 2013). As an example, Chatterji et al. (2013) suggest that the distribu-
tion of building sites in new industrial areas could be randomized, which would
lead to better results in subsequent impact analyses of cluster policies. While opti-
mally combining external validity and causality, randomized field experiments suf-
fer from a lack of applicability as their adequate design is time-consuming,
expensive, and often highly impractical; consequently, other methods are regularly
preferred (Angrist and Pischke 2010).
(5) Laboratory experiments can be considered an alternative to overly costly and
impractical field experimentation, combining a high level of causality with a high
level of applicability. Despite the lower level of external validity, laboratory studies
can be a valuable substitute for randomized field experiments and provide
insightful new angles to research topics inaccessible through “traditional” empirical
methods.
Since each method has its own strengths and weaknesses, the method used for a par-
ticular research question should be chosen depending on the object of research, the
availability of data, and the possibility for conducting field experimentation. Overall, a
mix of complementary empirical methods might thus be the most promising approach
(Weimann, 2015). In the following, we focus on laboratory experiments, which are the
most recent addition to the methodological toolbox of innovation research, including
discussing their limitations and advantages.
Limitations and advantages of experimental methods
Although lab experiments can be transferred and used to derive relevant policy impli-
cations, there are systematic limitations to this approach. Critics of lab experiments
such as Levitt and List (2007, 2008) emphasize the restrictions, while Falk and Heck-
man (2009) provide refutations.
Observation
Participants are observed and act in an artificial environment, which might influence
their behavior due to expectancy effects and the experimenter demand bias. Barmettler
et al. (2012) contradict this argument and show experimentally that complete anonym-
ity between the experimenter and participants does not change the latter’s behavior.
Furthermore, it is argued that close social observation is not limited to the lab but ra-
ther is a feature common to all economic interactions.
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Stakes
It can be argued that the stakes in experiments are too low to induce realistic behavior
in participants. Experiments with varying stake sizes yield mixed results depending on
the experimental situation (Camerer and Hogarth 1999). However, Falk and Heckman
(2009) ask how often people take choices involving sums equal to their monthly in-
comes and how representative such high-stake experiments would actually be. Conse-
quently, they suggest that the average level of stakes in laboratory experiments
correspond to the most common choices that individuals take.
Sample size
The sample sizes of lab experiments are criticized as being too small, although this is
refuted such that sample sizes are stated to adequately correspond to this method and
thus yield valid assertions.
Participants
Student participant pools are considered unrepresentative of the overall population.
While this might not be a problem when testing theories, in the case of innovation ex-
periments, other populations such as researchers or entrepreneurs might be more ap-
propriate experimental participants, depending on the research question.
Self-selection
There is a self-selection bias since students with particular traits sign up for participant
pools. Nevertheless, student pools ensure that the selection can be controlled and pro-
vide information on participants’ demographics, personal backgrounds, and prefer-
ences. Thus, the disadvantages connected to selection biases—which are potentially
prevalent in field experiments as well as other empirical research methods—can be
somewhat controlled.
Learning
Participants often cannot learn in experiments and adjust their behavior accordingly,
yet this is also a prevalent factor in many economic interactions outside of the lab, as
real-world interactions can often be considered as one-shot games with no chance of
learning in repeated decisions. Furthermore, a large number of repeated games have
been considered in experimental settings to determine learning effects, for example,
Cooper et al. (1999) with regard to incentive systems.
External validity
Lab experiments are considered as lacking external validity, meaning that they produce
unrealistic data without further relevance for understanding the “real world”: a criticism
that holds true both for lab experiments and theoretic models (Weimann, 2015, pp.
240–241). The challenge in designing experiments is to establish the best way of isolat-
ing the causal effect of interest and thus providing insights about universally prevalent
effects that transfer to other economic situations outside of the lab. In a recent study,
Herbst and Mas (2015) show how well-designed experiments can ensure that individual
behavior outside the lab is captured adequately, thereby gaining a higher external valid-
ity than traditionally assumed for laboratory studies. Further studies comparing labora-
tory and field evidence will have to show whether this might change the general
perception of the external validity of lab experiments (Charness and Fehr 2015). How-
ever, in some research contexts, it might not be possible to substantially increase the
external validity. In such cases, lab experiments can serve as a starting point to isolate
clear effects of specific innovation instruments. Subsequently, these effects have to be
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investigated with other methods involving a higher external validity, e.g., field experi-
ments in a firm. These methods then have to show whether the initial results from the
laboratory hold in contexts outside the lab.
Generalizability
The lack of generalizability of behavioral patterns resulting from lab experiments that
refrain from testing a theoretical model is criticized. While the arguments mentioned
above reduce this problem, it remains a considerable drawback to some experimental
evidence. Nevertheless, every empirical method faces this issue due to the unavoidable
dependency of data on a specific context.
Overall, lab experiments entail several distinct advantages as they provide researchers
with the means of deriving causal relations from controlled manipulations of specific
conditions, while controlling all surrounding factors. This ensures precise measure-
ments and makes it possible to preclude confounding effects such as multiple incen-
tives or repeated interactions. The experimenter thus retains almost complete control
of the decision environment, namely the material payoffs, the information given to par-
ticipants, the order of decisions, the duration, and iterations of the experiment. Partici-
pants are assigned randomly, which reduces the selection bias. Moreover, they are
incentivized monetarily for their decisions, whereby it can be assumed that decisions
are taken seriously: “In this sense, behavior in the laboratory is reliable and real: Partici-
pants in the lab are human beings who perceive their behavior as relevant, experience
real emotions, and take decisions with real economic consequences” (Falk and Heck-
man 2009, p. 536). The results are replicable and they allow investigating specific institu-
tions at a relatively low cost. This can be particularly useful when considering exogenous
changes like policy interventions and new regulations, where counterfactual situations
can be created and their effects tested far more easily in lab rather than field experiments.
With the possibility of altering only one factor—e.g., the patent regime—lab experiments
allow analyzing the relevance of a particular factor without other factors confounding the
observed behavior. Furthermore, lab experiments enable the researcher to examine differ-
ent innovation types and effects of incentives and splitting up the innovation process to
observe individual behavior at particular points of the process (Falk and Heckman 2009;
Smith 1994, 2003).
In the following, we review examples of different fields of innovation research where
lab experiments have been put forth to provide novel insights.
Review
By analyzing the effects of specific policy instruments via economic experiments, sev-
eral of the advantages of lab experiments described above can be used fruitfully. In par-
ticular, it becomes possible to compare counterfactual data of decision situations with
and without a particular instrument. Therefore, it is possible to analyze subjects’ spe-
cific reactions to changes in the framework conditions, which is almost impossible
when using “real-world” data. There are additional merits to the controlled lab environ-
ment, in which only one factor is changed; for instance, innovation behavior and its de-
velopment can be observed and analyzed over several periods. Of course, the
innovation process is necessarily stylized in lab experiments; nevertheless, a number of
promising ideas concerning how to transfer the innovation process into the laboratory
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have been provided in recent years. Table 1 comprises the experiments reviewed in the
following chapters and summarizes in brief the particular task subjects had to solve.
Intellectual property rights
For instance, there are several experiments implementing (real effort) search tasks to
simulate the innovation process. Buchanan and Wilson (2014) design an experimental
environment with subjects producing, trading, and consuming rivalrous and non-
rivalrous goods. Rivalrous goods are produced out of two complements and can be
sold. By contrast, producing non-rivalrous goods is possible by participating in a search
task in order to find the “favorite good” of the specific period, which is more valuable
than the rivalrous good and—in opposition to rivalrous goods—can be sold several
times. The authors implement one treatment with intellectual property, in which selling
and transferring the non-rivalrous good is restricted to the respective owner, as well as
one treatment without intellectual property, where non-rivalrous goods can be created
several times. The authors find no differences in the value of produced non-rivalrous
goods and the average money earned regardless of intellectual property protection.
Table 1 Overview on reviewed experiments
Field of
research




Buchanan and Wilson 2014 Real effort
search task
Producing and trading rivalrous and non-
rivalrous goods composed of colors
Meloso et al. 2009 Real effort
search task
Solving the knapsack problem and trading the
potential components
Buccafusco and Sprigman 2010 Creative task Creating and trading poems
Crosetto 2010 Creative task Creating and extending words and deciding
whether to use IP protection




Brüggemann and Meub 2015 Creative task Creating and extending words, setting license
fees




Eckartz et al. 2012 Real effort
search task
Combining as many words as possible from 12
given letters
Ederer and Manso 2012 Real effort
search task
Managing a virtual lemonade stand
Erat and Gneezy 2015 Creative task Solving rebus puzzles
Bradler 2015 Creative task Imagining unusual uses for items
R&D
competition
Isaac and Reynolds 1988 Investment task Taking investment choices under competition
Isaac and Reynolds 1992 Investment task Taking investment choices including the game
bingo
Sbriglia and Hey 1994 Search task Finding a letter combination by buying
different letter trails under competition
Zizzo 2002 Investment task Competing for a prize over several periods
Silipo 2005 Investment task Accumulating “knowledge units” under risk
and competition
Cantner et al. 2009 Search task Searching for product specifications of a car
including investment and competition
Aghion et al. 2014 Investment task Competing for finding an innovation including
investment and risk
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Overall, Buchanan and Wilson suggest that intellectual property protection does not
spur innovativeness. However, the protection only serves as an additional incentive,
whereas the existence of entrepreneurial individuals is more important. The respective
entrepreneurs subsequently profit substantially from the protection, as well as generat-
ing wealth without intellectual property protection.
Meloso et al. (2009) use another kind of search task—namely the knapsack proble-
m—to simulate intellectual discovery in a patent and a non-patent market system, in
which components of potential discoveries are traded. The goal of the knapsack prob-
lem is to combine inputs of a particular value and realize an optimal weighing of the
components. In sum, the number of subjects who were able to find the correct solution
to the knapsack task was higher in the markets system, which has the advantages that
no scope of intellectual property rights has to be defined beforehand and that it entails
no monopoly rights. Therefore, the authors state that markets do not necessarily
fail—as theoretical contributions suggest—for non-excludable and non-rival goods.
Buccafusco and Sprigman (2010) let subjects write poems and implement a market for
the poems. Depending on the initial distribution of intellectual property rights, they find
different preferences of the innovators, owners, and buyers. There is a robust endowment
effect that manifests itself in the high offers of innovators and a significantly lower willing-
ness to pay among the buyers. This experiment has the advantage of simulating the
innovation activity most closely on an individual level, yet it is not possible to further
evaluate the particular poems and determine a ranking for the quality of the innovations.
Including further features of the innovation process—namely creativity, ownership,
and investment choices—Crosetto (2010) developed a task to simulate innovative activ-
ity based upon the board game Scrabble. He uses his setting to analyze the individual
behavior when subjects have to create and extend words and are able to select between
the intellectual property schemes of open source and fixed license fees. He finds that
subjects’ propensity to provide their innovations open source is more likely when the level
of license fees is high. Brüggemann et al. (2015) extend this experimental setting to test
for the effect of different regulatory incentive schemes on the individual innovativeness.
They compare a treatment with the possibility to choose the amount of license fees to a
system without license fees and further implement the ability to communicate. They find
that communication does not change the innovative behavior and that welfare is higher in
the no-license-fee system than in the license-fee system. However, when given the possi-
bility to license innovations, subjects display a high demand for being rewarded monetar-
ily rather than providing innovations to other participants free of charge.
Financial instruments
There is broad literature about the difficulties in analyzing the effect of subsidies and other
public programs to foster innovativeness due to endogeneity and selection bias problems.
Although the methods used have advanced substantially in past years, lab experiments can
contribute to this sub-field of innovation research (Blundell and Costa Dias 2009). In some
cases, experiments might be the only way to provide insights about new—and potentially
costly—policy instruments before they are implemented in the “real world.” This approach
might thus be a particularly promising methodological choice when new institutional frame-
work conditions are tested, which aim at fostering the innovative activity. Nevertheless,
there is only a limited number of studies dealing with financial instruments to date.
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Using the Scrabble-based word creation task introduced by Crosetto (2010), Brüggemann
and Meub (2015) analyze the individual behavior in two types of innovation contests by
awarding subjects with a bonus for the best innovation in one treatment and for the largest
innovation effort in another, comparing individual performance to a benchmark treatment
without a prize. They find that the willingness to cooperate decreases when innovation con-
tests are introduced, while the overall welfare remains constant across treatments. Further-
more, using the same word task, Brüggemann (2015) analyzes the effects of two distinct
forms of subsidies on innovativeness: first, by supplying resources determined for innovative
activities and, second, by providing additional financial resources not restricted to the use in
innovative activities. She finds that both forms of subsidy lead to a crowding-out of private
investment and negative welfare effects when the costs for the subsidy are included.
Furthermore, subsidies fail to induce a positive effect on the individual innovation behavior.
Payment schemes
Another class of experiments focuses on the creative element of innovation and the ef-
fects of different payment schemes. Eckartz et al. (2012) test the effects of different pay-
ment schemes on creativity using a word-based real effort task, where subjects have to
combine as many words as possible out of 12 prescribed letters within a certain time.
They examine a flat fee, a linear payment, and a tournament and find no substantial
differences between the three incentive schemes. Similarly analyzing different payment
schemes, Ederer and Manso (2012) compare the innovative activity when offering a
fixed wage, a wage based upon pay-for-performance, and a split wage, which is fixed at
the beginning and based upon performance later on. In a search task, subjects have to
manage a lemonade stand, whereby they have to decide upon several variables such as
the location, content, and price to find the most profitable solution. The authors find
that the split wage with tolerance for early failure and compensation for long-term suc-
cess leads to more innovative effort and higher overall welfare.
Erat and Gneezy (2015) compare three payment schemes, namely a pay-for-
performance scheme, a competitive scheme, and a benchmark without incentives. Un-
like Ederer and Manso (2012), they use rebus puzzles as a creative task and find that
competition reduces creativity and a pay-for-performance scheme does not change cre-
ativity in comparison to a situation without incentives. Comparing the two financial in-
centives, creativity is higher in a pay-for-performance scheme.
Bradler (2015) used the “unusual uses task”—an established creativity test—to compare ac-
complishment, self-reporting, and risk behavior. In the task, subjects have to imagine as
many uses for a particular object as possible in a certain time, choosing their preferred pay-
ment scheme prior to the task, i.e., a tournament or a fixed payment. She finds that the dif-
ferent payment schemes appeal to different types of subjects: risk-loving subjects with a high
self-assessment tend to choose the tournament; however, in contrast to previous studies, cre-
ative subjects do not tend to choose the tournament more often than the fixed payment.
R&D competition
Finally, in the experiments on R&D competition, the authors focus on different
investment task to analyze the individual behavior in competitive and innovative
environments. Experiments on patent races and R&D competition were first
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established by Isaac and Reynolds (1988) to simulate a one-stage stochastic inven-
tion model and subsequently a two-staged model (Isaac and Reynolds 1992). This
class of experiments aims to test the findings of models with empirical evidence,
whereby—in contrast to the experiments described before—they do not analyze
specific policy instruments. Sbriglia and Hey (1994) develop a costly combinator-
ial task representing research competition for a patentable innovation to analyze
three behavioral problems of patent races, namely how subjects select their
search procedures, which investment strategies they use, and how information is
processed. The authors identify different types of innovators: the “winners”, who
search successfully, do not act randomly, and invest more in comparison to the
“losers”, who are unable to establish a strategic search procedure. Furthermore,
stronger competition accelerates the rate of investment, and with a higher num-
ber of periods, successful players more commonly adapt their searching behavior.
Zizzo (2002) tests the multi-stage patent race model by Harris and Vickers
(1987) with an investment task where subjects compete for a monetary prize over
several periods. Their results disconfirm the theoretical assertions, as leaders of a
patent race do not invest more than their followers. Furthermore, the authors
find no virtual monopoly and investments do not change as predicted by the
model. Silipo (2005) analyze the cooperation and break-up behavior in joint ven-
tures in a dynamic patent race model theoretically and experimentally. In the
model, they find that the starting positions of the competitors are crucial for be-
ing cooperative or not: if the innovators start at different points of the research
process, the probability of joint ventures decreases, while in joint ventures, the
pace of the process slows down. The results of their experiment correspond to
the model, aside from some races in which subjects perform worse than
anticipated.
Cantner et al. (2009) test a patent race model limited to a duopoly market
without price competition by implementing a multi-dimensional search task
with uncertainty. They find that different strategies solve the task, namely risky
innovative investment and risk-free imitations. On average, subjects choose the
risky innovative investment based upon the risk of an investment failure, their
anticipated revenue, and their relative success in the experiment. Furthermore,
the gap in subjects’ earnings has a positive impact on their investment in the
next periods. Finally, Aghion et al. (2014) analyze the effects of competition on a step-by-
step innovation by means of a risky investment task with different levels of competition
and time horizons. The results show an increase in investment for neck-and-neck firms,
yet a decrease in investment for firms lagging behind.
Conclusions
In this paper, we present the limitations and advantages of using laboratory experi-
ments for innovation research and review 18 examples from four specific fields in
which lab experiments already have been conducted. As the experimental method
yields promising results in testing intellectual property rights, financial instruments,
payment schemes, and R&D competition, we suggest that laboratory experiments can
serve as a useful additional tool to innovation economists and represent a source of
promising new insights for innovation research.
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In particular, we argue that lab experiments should be used to target specific policy
questions and thus provide measures for the effectiveness of specific instruments prior
to their introduction. This approach has—in marked contrast to all other methods—the
advantages of yielding evidence from counterfactual situations and a strong control of the
setting, for example, when testing external incentives for innovative activity or changing pa-
rameters of the institutional framework. Therefore, we follow Chetty (2015) and Weimann
(2015), who suggest a pragmatic perspective on behavioral economics, thus adding experi-
mental evidence to the existing methods whenever its particular advantages outweigh its
limitations. Within this pragmatic perspective on laboratory experiments, there are three
ways in which this field of research can contribute to public policy: by presenting new policy
instruments, developing better predictions regarding the effects of existing policies, and
more accurately measuring welfare implications. Besides the policy implications, this strand
of literature can be used to derive managerial implications. Particularly, studies on external
incentives for fostering innovative activities are of relevance, since they give managers prac-
tical advice on how to best foster innovative activities of their employees, by using, e.g., ex-
periments analyzing the optimal payment schemes for innovative activities.
We hope that this overview encourages other researchers to use lab experiments in
innovation research, which could be further developed in several domains of
innovation research: as the existing laboratory studies on financial instruments
measure effectiveness, future studies might focus on measuring efficiency, which
would reflect promising progress in evaluating new means of public policy. Further-
more, lab experiments might be helpful as a methodological starting point for devel-
oping new policy instruments. From a managerial perspective, future experimental
innovation research might address the more comprehensive understanding of the
innovation process itself. For example, experimental researchers might analyze in-
novative work in teams and thus decompose the innovation process into its compo-
nents, which is effectively possible in a laboratory environment. Moreover, the role
of external incentives to encourage employees’ innovativeness might be further
emphasized.
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